| THE PROLIFERATION OF DICTATORSHIPS
INTRODUCTION
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Despite its immense mineral wealth, sub-Saharan Africa – or Africa – remains the least developed of all the regions in the Third World. For decades, its dismal economic performance was attributed to “external factors”: colonial legacies, the lingering effects of the slave trade, an unjust international economic system, predatory practices of multi-national corporations, among others. However in the late 1980s, a consensus emerged that singled out poor governance as the primary culprit for Africa’s lackluster performance in the post-colonial era. Indeed, following the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the donor community added multi-party democracy as a political conditionality for receipt of foreign aid. As The Economist put it: "Aid donors were embarrassed to be seen backing freedom in Eastern Europe, while hobnobbing with dictators in Africa . . . So the donors, already `totally fed up' with Africa's performance, according to a senior aid official, changed their tune" (Feb 22, 1992; p. 20).
Accordingly, both the World Bank and the United Nations began stressing the importance of democratic institutions to secure political renewal and human development (World Bank, 1989; p. 6; Human Development Report, May 1990). At a conference on "The Prospects for Africa in the 1990s" held in the British House of Commons on June 9, 1990, British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Douglas Hurd asserted the need for political pluralism to achieve economic success: "Economic success depends to a large degree on effective and honest government, political pluralism and observance of the rule of law, as well as freer, more open economies." He called on aid donors to direct their support to countries "tending toward pluralism, public accountability, respect for the rule of law, human rights, and market principles" (The Times, London, June 7, 1990). Further, New African reported that John Major, as Britain's chancellor of the exchequer, warned African nations in a speech delivered to the IMF that they would have to make "sweeping political and social changes," including cutting military spending and moving to democratic political systems, to qualify for international aid (July 1990; p. 31). Indeed, Malawi saw its aid from Britain halved to $8.6 million in 1992 and in that same year the United States suspended aid to Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire. In November 1991 the World Bank and other donors withheld aid to Kenya for six months until it instituted steps toward democratic reform.
After a decade of experimentation with democracy however, Africa’s economic prospects remain grim, raising several questions about the linkage. Is democracy the sine qua non for economic prosperity? If so, is the Western-type of multi-party democracy suitable for Africa? Or must Africa search for and practice its own unique form of democracy?
Many scholars have argued that Africa is not yet ready for democracy and that any democratization process in Africa is doomed to fail. A variety of reasons has been cited: insufficient internal demand for political reform due to a weak civil society; unsuitability of Western forms of multi-party democracy; absence of a democratic culture and institutions (Monga, 1996: 20-27). These scholarly arguments have naturally found enthusiastic reception among Africa’s autocrats, who established repressive one-party state systems that admitted no democratic pluralism in the post-colonial period.
After independence in the 1960s, the first generation of African nationalist leaders and military strongmen spurned democracy, despite Africa’s own indigenous political tradition of participatory democracy under chieftaincy as witnessed by erudite village meetings. African nationalists, such as Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda, and Hastings Banda, dismissed the concept of "democracy" as alien, claiming that multiparty democracy was "a Western thing," and "a luxury Africa could not afford.” Others claimed that "Africa had no democratic culture," and that "too many feuding tribes made democracy a risky venture." For example, Presidents Paul Biya of Cameroon and Daniel arap Moi of Kenya vehemently opposed multiparty democracy on grounds that it would degenerate into destructive tribal politics. The late Dr. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana denounced it as an "imperialist dogma." Said President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire: "Democracy is not for Africa. There was only one African chief and he ruled for life. Here in Zaire we must make unity" (The Wall Street Journal, 14 October 1985, 1).
After winning independence for their respective countries, these African nationalist leaders were all hailed as heroes, swept into power with huge parliamentary majorities, and deified. Statues were built for them, monuments, stadia, and streets named after them. Currencies bore their portraits. They heaped vainglorious epithets upon themselves: Osagyefo, the Guide, the Messiah, the Redeemer, the Teacher. They brooked no criticism. Criticizing them was sacrilegious. Newspapers that did so were banned and their editors jailed. They then used their parliamentary majorities to subvert their constitutions, outlaw opposition parties, and declare their countries "one-party states" and themselves presidents-for-life – political systems that bore no affinity to their own indigenous systems. For example, just one month after Malawi gained its independence from Britain in July 1964, the new Prime Minister, Hastings Banda, declared: “one party, one leader, one government and no nonsense about it” (The Washington Post, June 16, 1999; A24). In this way, autocratic personal rule came to be established in most African countries over much of the postcolonial period.
Sandbrook (1993) gave a composite portrait of the typical African tyrant and how he rules:
The strongman, usually the president, occupies the centre of the political life. Front and centre stage, he is the centrifugal force around which all else revolves. Not only the ceremonial head of state, the president is also the chief political, military and cultural figure: head of government, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, head of the governing party (if there is one) and even chancellor of the local university. His aim is typically to identify his person with the "nation."
He is present everywhere: his picture is hung on public walls, billboards, government offices, and even private homes. His portrait also embellishes stamps, coins, paper currency, and even stationery of state corporations. Schools, hospitals and stadiums are named after him. The state-controlled media herald his every word and action, no matter how misguided.
Admittedly, the dilemmas faced by African leaders after independence may have precipitated the rush toward personal rule. First, artificial colonial boundaries did not coincide with ethnic groupings, and, therefore, few African countries constitute nation-states.
As Sandbrook (1993) explained: A nation, on the one hand, is a social group that develops solidarity on the basis of shared customs and institutions; on the other hand, a state is a political organization, laying claim to power in a particular territory. Where nation and state are coterminous, ethnic loyalty (nationalism) fuses with state loyalty (patriotism). The state acquires legitimacy and internal cohesion permitting it to override personal and sectional preoccupations with a vision of a greater good. (49)
In Africa, however, these conditions are rarely met. Although Swaziland, Lesotho, and Somalia qualify, the majority of the states are multi-national (or poly-ethnic). A citizen's loyalty may not extend beyond his own ethnic group, making state legitimacy very fragile. A unifying leader, like a Gandhi or a Tito, may then emerge to provide that article of cohesion and thereby check resurgent ethnicism. But to be successful, he must rule with absolute impartiality, placing the interests of the state above his own and those of his ethnic group -- a criteria that most postcolonial African leaders have failed to meet.
Second, predominantly peasant societies were left in Africa after colonialism, who are notoriously difficult to organize on a national class basis. In addition, social stratifications between capitalists and workers had not crystallized. Thus, tribalism was more relevant to African political life than ideology or class warfare. This set the stage, as Sandbrook (1993) noted, "for a strongman to play the central integrating role. He overcomes political schisms and builds his personal rule by distributing material benefits, capitalizing on personal loyalties and coercing recalcitrants. Appeals on a class or patriotic basis are unsuccessful" (64).
However, these dilemmas, regardless of their validity, played into the hands of the nationalists and provided them with the cover to advance their own selfish political ambitions. They proceeded to set up autocratic, one-party state systems that bore no affinity to their own indigenous systems. In country after country, heads of state filled important positions in key institutions, such as the civil service, the military, and the judiciary and surrounded themselves with members of their own ethnic group: the late Samuel Doe of Liberia with the Krahn; Moi of Kenya with the Kalenjin; Biya of Cameroon with the Beti; Eyadema of Togo with the Kabye; Rawlings of Ghana with the Ewe; and so on. As Peter Wanyande (1988) noted: "In African one-party states, the rulers have tended to use their power and the institutions they control not only to promote their own individual and group interest as rulers -- and in some cases sectional as opposed to national interests -- but also to manipulate and undermine the rights and freedoms of the rest of society" (74).
None of this fits Africa's own indigenous political heritage. The most heinous departure has been military dictatorships. Many scholars, including Africans, have acquiesced to brutal military regimes in Africa by citing Africa's warrior tradition. But an exhaustive study of indigenous African political systems does not reveal soldiers or men in uniform serving as chiefs or heads of village governments. The heads were always civilian.
In 1990, only 4 of the 54 African countries were democratic. After the collapse of communism in 1989, however, the “winds of change” swept across Africa and the democratic reform process gathered momentum. Although the number of democratic African countries grew to 15 in 1995 it has slid back to 13 in 1998 (Botswana, Benin, Cape Verde Islands, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Namibia, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, and Zambia). Admittedly, few of these countries listed would meet a rigorous definition of a "democracy," which means more then holding periodic elections. Among the other requirements for a democratic system are a freely-negotiated constitution, a free media, an independent judiciary, a neutral and professional armed/security forces, an independent electoral commission, and the ability of the voters to exercise their democratic rights without fear, intimidation or assassination threats. Many of these requirements have not been met in even some of Africa’s “democratic” countries.
Senegal, for example, is one of Africa's oldest experiments in democracy but has been a disappointing de facto one-party state. Technically, it is a multi-party system but the opposition parties are too small and numerous to challenge the dominant party's lock on power. For example, in the May 24, 1998 elections, 18 major political parties vied to end 38 years of domination by President Abdou Diouf's ruling Socialist Party. In addition, fraud and the rewards system ensure that the ruling party never loses: "People are rewarded with bags of rice; workers in pro-government trade unions get the best pay and conditions; student party members are first in line for scholarships. All this binds people into a blurred entity consisting of the state, the government and the ruling party" (The Economist, 18 April 1998, 44).
Elsewhere in Africa, wily autocrats quickly learned new tricks to beat back the democratic challenge by inflating voter rolls, manipulating the electoral rules, intimidating voters and holding fraudulent elections to return themselves to power, as in Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Niger, Togo, and Zimbabwe.
After General Ibrahim Bare Mainassara seized power in a 27 January 1996 coup in Niger, he decided to contest the presidential elections he was holding for the country on July 6, 1996. When early results showed that he was losing,
Mainassara sacked and replaced the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) with his own appointees, placed his opponents under guard in their own houses. The other contenders' home phone lines were also cut off. A ban on public gatherings in Niamey was announced on the evening of 9 July. Security forces were deployed at candidates' homes and some political party offices. The floodlit Palais des Sports where results were centralized was guarded by an armored car and heavy machine guns mounted on pickup trucks. Two radio stations were stopped from broadcasting and all of the country's international phone lines were suspended (African News Weekly, 15-21 July 1996, 2).
This crass strong-arm tactic was also adopted by Africa’s longest serving autocrat, President Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo. On June 21, 1998, President Gnassingbe Eyadema who had ruled Togo for 31 years, stood for re-election. His supporters, mostly his Kabye people from central Togo who back the army, the police and the bureaucracy, fudged the electoral rolls, denied the opposition access to the state-run media and intimidated opposiiton politicians. Still, "when the votes began to be counted, it was clear that Gilchrist Olympio, the chief opposition candidate and son of the country's first president, was going to win. Whereupon the paramilitary police stepped in and stopped the count in Lome: ballot boxes were seized and burned. The head of the electoral commission and four of its members resigned. The interior minister declared President Eyadema the winner anyway" (The Economist, 4 July 1998, 40).
Thus, the democratic reform process, which gathered momentum after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, had stalled by the dawn of the new century. Addressing a press conference in London in April, 2000, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan “lambasted African leaders who have subverted democracy and lined their pockets with public funds, although he stopped short of naming names” (The African-American Observer, April 25-May 1, 2000; p.10).
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George Ayittey,
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